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1816. 
 
PETER J. KITSON 
 
Amherst’s Embassy and Early Nineteenth-Century Sino-British Relations 
Two hundred years ago in the early hours of the morning 29 August 1816 (Jiaqing 
21), William Pitt, Lord Amherst, unrested after travelling overnight, was 
unceremoniously manhandled in an attempt to usher him physically with his two 
deputies, George Thomas Staunton and Henry Ellis, into the presence of the Jiaqing 
Emperor at the Summer Palace of Yuanming Yuan. Exhausted, dirty after a very 
uncomfortable overnight journey and separated from his diplomatic credentials and 
ambassadorial robes, Amherst and his two deputies resisted, leaving the palace in 
anger. It was reported to the emperor that Amherst’s inability to attend the audience 
was occasioned by an indisposition, as was that of his deputies. The emperor, when 
discovering the diplomatic nature of this evasion, immediately and perhaps 
impulsively, dismissed the embassy without granting it an imperial audience and 
rejected its ‘tribute’ of gifts. Amherst’s party then began their long, overland journey 
south to Canton (Guangzhou) where the group embarked for home. 
 British accounts, of which they were several, laid this ostensible ‘failure’ of 
the embassy to secure an imperial audience not on the Jiaqing Emperor, but on the 
scheming of certain senior court officials who had unwisely assured him that Amherst 
had practiced and was prepared to perform the ceremony of the full imperial koutou 
(or ketou both Mandarin) or ‘kowtow’ (anglicised) with three kneelings accompanied 
by three knockings of the forehead for each prostration.  The British suspected that 
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Chinese officials had reckoned that by compelling an exhausted Amherst into an 
imperial audience, he would be obliged to perform a ceremony that, after much 
deliberation, he had unambiguously refused to undertake. They also suspected that the 
Viceroy of Canton and his associates had prejudiced the court against them (Davis, 
Sketches, p. 81).  After a process of extended negotiation Amherst had offered to his 
Chinese minders to perform the ceremony that his more famous predecessor, 
Viscount George Macartney, had agreed to undertake for the Qianlong Emperor at 
Jehol in September 1793, kneeling on one knee and bowing his head thrice as he 
would before his sovereign, George III.  Indeed in an extension of this compromise 
the ambassador had offered to perform this kneeling not once but three times with the 
full complement of nine bows of the head in total. He also (like Macartney) had 
offered to perform the complete ceremony if either a Chinese court official of equal 
status would kowtow to a portrait of the Prince Regent, or if the emperor would 
supply a written undertaking that any Chinese official appointed to the court of St 
James in future would perform the ceremony in front of a British monarch. The 
Qianlong Emperor had accepted Macartney’s compromise in 1793; his fifth son and 
successor would not.  The expensive items brought by the British as ‘presents’ for the 
Jiaqing Emperor, costing some £20,000 were not accepted, though afterwards, the 
emperor agreed to a very limited and symbolic exchange of a few items in his 
apparent recognition of the sincerity and obedience of the Prince Regent in sending 
this tribute (Kitson, ‘Dark Gift’). The embassy left Canton for home on 28 January 
1817, suffering shipwreck and pirate attack on the return voyage, and visiting the 
deposed emperor Napoleon on St Helena (who told Amherst he was very foolish not 
to kowtow), arriving back in Britain on 17 August 1817. 
 The Amherst Embassy was only the second British embassy to visit China but 
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technically the fourth to be sent. The first official British mission to attempt to 
approach China was organised in Calcutta not London by Warren Hastings, 
Governor-general of Bengal (Teltscher, High Road to China). Hastings dispatched 
George Bogle to Tibet in 1774, but he did not cross into China. In 1788 the first 
embassy from the British mainland to China was aborted when its ambassador, Lt-
Colonel Charles Cathcart died en route (Morse, Chronicles 2.151-170). It was thus 
not until 1793 that Viscount Macartney finally arrived at the imperial court of the 
Qianlong Emperor for his more celebrated and critically discussed visit.1 To a great 
extent scholars of British literature and culture have largely forgotten or ignored the 
the Amherst embassy twenty-three years later in their accounts of early nineteenth 
century and its place in the lead up to the First Opium War of 1839-42. For the 
Chinese, this war marks the beginning of their highly traumatic ‘Century of National 
Humiliation’ (bǎinián guóchǐ) that concluded in 1949 with the establishment of the 
Peoples Republic of China (Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation).  
 Comparatively little has been written about Amherst’s embassy, either from 
the British or the Chinese viewpoints, which has tended to be largely viewed, when it 
is noted at all, as a farcical repetition of its more famous predecessor.2 The embassy 
along with the two earlier British attempts to take possession of the Portuguese 
enclave of Macao in 1802 and 1808, however, demands the attention of both 
historians and critics of the cultural relations between China and Britain in the 
nineteenth century. Wensheng Wang’s reappraisal of the reforming reign of the 
Jiaqing Emperor (1796-1820) presents a more complex and nuanced account of this 
                                                        
1 Influential discussions include: Hevia, Cherishing Men; Peyrefitte, Clash of Two 
Civilizations, and Porter, Ideographia, 000-000. 
2 For the details of the embassy, see Morse, Chronicles, 3. 256-306; Gao, ‘Amherst 
embassy’; Min, ‘Narrating the Far East’; Peyrefitte, Collision of Two Civilisations, 
pp. 504-111; Hevia, Cherishing Men, pp. 210-18. 
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crucial period in Chinese history. (White Lotus Rebels) Whereas H. B. Morse referred 
to ‘the degenerate and corrupt court’ of 1816 Wang describes a frugal, thoughtful, 
self-critical and reforming monarch, keenly aware of the two British attempts to take 
over Macao and nervous about their power (Chronicles 3.258). When Macartney 
visited China in 1793 it was nearing the end of the prosperous Qianlong era. When 
Amherst arrived, the empire was suffering severe problems, subject to 
overpopulation, land shortages, frequent rebellions and serious financial issues. It was 
also at this time, as Zheng Yangwen has demonstrated, that opium consumption in 
China was transformed from a largely elite cultural practice into popular activity, due 
to the increasing supply of the drug from British controlled Bengal, used by the 
Company to recuperate huge amounts of silver bullion paid to the Chinese to fuel the 
more beneficial but also growing British addiction to tea (Social Use of Opium, pp. 
00-00; Trocki, Opium, Empire, pp. 33-57; Lovell, Opium War, pp. 32-33). Wang 
argues that the Jiaqing Emperor successfully enforced two major British climb downs 
over Macao and his subsequent, strict treatment of the Amherst embassy wasintended  
to confirm imperial strength in the face of opportunistic British aggression. James L. 
Hevia similarly comments that ‘the Jiaqing court reviewed the historical record of the 
embassy, took tensions in Canton into account, and organized the greeting and 
preparation phase of Guest Ritual accordingly’ (Cherishing Men, p. 220). The Jiaqing 
Emperor emerges not as a decadent, weak or petulant ruler imprisoned within an 
ossified ritualistic ceremonialism, but one who was capable of reacting pragmatically 
to the complex, challenging and rapidly changing political landscape that confronted 
him. The choices facing the increasingly beleaguered emperor, however, were stark. 
 Contemporary responses to the earlier Macartney embassy were certainly 
mixed. Macartney and his admirers regarded his embassy as something of a personal 
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diplomatic triumph. He claimed his mission ‘laid a foundation of amity, good offices, 
and immediate intercourse with the Imperial Court.’ (cited in Pritchard, ‘The 
Kowtow’, p. 375) Others were not as convinced. Contemporary views of the Amherst 
embassy, however, generally viewed it as a failure; John Crawfurd reviewing Henry 
Ellis’ Journal of the Proceedings of the late Embassy to China for the Edinburgh 
Review commented ‘everybody who knew anything of the matter, we believe, was 
prepared for that catastrophe of this new Chinese mission, which actually ensued.’ 
(Edinburgh Review 29 [1818], p. 433) Eun Kyung Min argued that the various 
narratives of the embassy took on ‘the added burden of interpreting the history of 
their failed mission to open up trade with China […] by attempting to sort out the 
convolutions of commerce, civility, and ceremony’. (Min, ‘Narrating the Far East’, p. 
162) Patrick Tuck charged that the embassy ‘was not merely a failure, it was a fiasco.’ 
(Staunton, Notes, p. viii) Lo-shu Fu, however, while regarding the embassy as an 
unambiguous diplomatic failure, draws attention to the new knowledge that was 
gained of the northern Chinese coast and especially of Korea, surveyed by the 
embassy’s ships while Amherst journeyed overland to and from the Qing court and 
disseminated in John Macleod (M’Leod) and Basil Hall’s narratives (Documentary 
Chronicle, p. 403). Gao Hao stresses the importance of the embassy’s discoveries in 
China after the official proceedings were concluded (‘Amherst Embassy’ p. 571). The 
embassy was granted unprecedented and unexpected freedom of movement during its 
four-month journey from Beijing to Guangzhou (Canton), taking a different route 
from that of Macartney’s 1793 return, one that had not previously been taken by a 
Briton. Macartney’s mission travelled to the Southern end of the Grand Canal, 
whereas Amherst’s party transferred from Guazhou to the Yangtze River. They sailed 
285 miles along the Yangtze to Poyang Lake and from there on smaller inland 
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waterways to Guangzhou.  
 Britons were thus allowed to visit parts of the lower Yangtze delta hitherto 
unexplored by Europeans. As Amherst wrote to Canning, the embassy enjoyed ‘a 
greater degree of liberty than has been granted to any former embassy’.3 The 
members of the embassy were also able to communicate more fully with the Chinese 
people than they had hitherto under the jealously guarded Macartney embassy, 
rambling in the countryside, visiting cities and towns, purchasing souvenirs and even 
playing the first recorded game of cricket in China. At times more like tourists than 
guests, the embassy gathered valuable first-hand knowledge of China. The 
information that they gained about the country would provide useful intelligence as 
Hao argues, such ‘important perceptions laid the foundation for future changes in 
Sino-British relations and led, indirectly, to the outbreak of the first Opium War in 
1839.’ (‘Amherst Embassy’, p. 587) The strategic and formal mission of the embassy 
was not accomplished, yet it was of major importance in changing British views of 
China in the lead up to the War and, arguably, marked the first major event taken in 
that process.  This context thus problematizes our understanding of success and 
failure.  
 The Macartney embassy lead to the publication of some fifteen or so accounts, 
the Amherst embassy also produced fifteen contemporary narratives published and 
unpublished by eleven of its members.4 The official account, authored by Henry Ellis 
was published in (1817) and widely reviewed; Clarke Abel’s Narrative focusing on 
                                                        
3 Letter from Amherst to George Canning, 8 March 1817. British Library, London: 
India Office Records (hereafter IOR) G/12/197, f.281. 
4 Ellis, Journal; Staunton, Notes of Proceedings and Occurrences; Miscellaneous 
Notices; Morrison, Memoir; Abel, Narrative of a Journey; Macleod, Narrative of a 
Voyage; Hall, Narrative of a Voyage; Davis, Sketches of China; ‘Henry Hayne Diary 
1816-1817’. China Through Western Eyes: Manuscript Records of Traders, 
Travellers, Missionaries and Diplomats, 1792-1842. 4 vols (London: Adam Matthew 
Microfilm Publications, 1996); Martin, ‘Journal of Sir William Fanshawe Martin.’ 
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natural history was published in 1818 and accounts of the exploratory voyages of the 
embassy were published by naval personnel John McLeod (1817) and Basil Hall 
(1818), containing the first substantive British discussion of Korean culture, another 
under-explored area. The embassy’s main interpreter, the missionary Robert 
Morrison, contributed a briefer memoir in 1820. The embassy’s deputy, George 
Thomas Staunton, authored a substantial, but privately circulated account printed for a 
limited audience of politicians and company personnel only in 1824. Staunton when 
aged twelve had served as Macartney’s page on the first embassy and was the son of 
Macartney’s deputy, George Leonard Staunton. It was not until 1841, some twenty 
four years after the outbreak of hostilities with China, that John Francis Davis, 
Company man and another interpreter on the embassy published his major, two 
volume account of the embassy’s progress and failure, Sketches of China.  
 The embassy originated in an attempt to address a series of specific grievances 
about the Canton system and the trade with China (most of which were resolved by 
the time of its arrival in China) (Morse, Chronicles, 3. 279-284; IOR G12/196 f. 195-
97). The East India Company financed the embassy and it was in its interests that it 
was dispatched. John Barrow, who had served as comptroller on Macartney’s 
embassy, now elevated to the powerful position of second secretary at the Admiralty 
had canvassed a sequel to Macartney’s embassy earlier, and enthusiastically in 1805. 
In 1815, however, the times seemed especially propitious. Britain had just defeated its 
major continental rival, the Napoleonic Empire, and its future as a global trading and 
imperial power seemed assured. That year Barrow proposed to the government ‘a 
Mission to the Court of Pekin, in order to announce the restoration of a general peace 
in this quarter of the World; and of congratulating the Emperor upon his recent escape 
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from assassination.’5  
 The embassy because it never achieved an audience with the emperor, entered 
into any substantial negotiations, or concluded any agreements, was generally 
regarded as a complete failure. Yet at least two of the embassy’s participants, Davis 
and Staunton, would later both view it as leading to a distinct improvement in trading 
conditions and thus, paradoxically, a success because of it was a formal failure, thus 
problematizing any simple understanding of ‘success’ or ‘failure’. (Davis, The 
Chinese, 1.181; Staunton, Memoirs, pp. 67-68) As a Company employee, Davis fully 
supported the advice of Staunton that the performance of the kowtow ceremonial was 
unlikely to achieve anything positive, and would only have negative consequences for 
the Company at Canton. His Sketches, however, indicates that there might have been 
a much more pragmatic motivation in the British resistance to perform the full 
ceremonial. He writes that because ‘there seemed so little prospect of succeeding in 
anything, that it became a question whether the point of ceremony might not be the 
best to break off upon, since it would involve no article of negotiation, but be a good 
mode of asserting our independence, without making other matters worse than they 
were before’ (1. 55-56). He argues that they ‘should gain nothing more with 
compliance than we could gain without it’ and that he ‘instead of gaining any points 
by such measure, we should only become contemptible in the eyes of the Chinese, 
and in fact do ourselves more harm than good (1.109)’. The negotiations over the 
ceremonial proved an unambiguous object lesson for Davis for what he understood to 
be Qing diplomacy: the Chinese are ‘too proud to learn any thing about us, while we 
foreigners study them in every relation of life, and have availed ourselves to some 
purpose the opportunities (scanty as these may have comparatively been), which years 
                                                        
5 ‘Minute of Secret Court of the Directors held on Wednesday the 22nd February 
1815’. IOR/G12/196, f.44. 
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of intercourse afforded us.’ He indicates that this embassy, like that of Macartney’s 
was an opportunity to acquire ‘that “power” which consists in “Knowledge” .’ 
However, what he claims to know and understand is not the subtleties of complex 
Qing guest ritual, but a stereotypical understanding that ‘the most complete faith, the 
most unblushing perfidy, is one part of the Chinese system in their negotiations with 
strangers’. (1. 109) Davis was subsequently appointed second superintendent of 
British trade in China alongside the luckless Lord Napier in December 1833. After 
Napier's death in 1834, he briefly became chief superintendent before resigning this 
position in January 1835. In 1844 he was appointed as the second governor and 
commander-in-chief of the new British colony of Hong Kong. By this time he had 
established himself as Britain’s major sinologist of the mid-century. In The Chinese: 
A General Description of China and its Inhabitants  (1836; 1851). Davis concluded 
that: 
 
It has often been a subject of just remark, that this unsuccessful mission was 
followed by a longer interval of tranquillity and freedom from Chinese 
annoyances, than had ever been experienced before. From the year 1816 to 1829 
not a single stoppage of the British trade took place, except in the affair of the 
Topaze frigate in 1822; and there the Canton government was glad to make the 
first advances to a resumption of the suspended intercourse (1. 81). 
 
 Davis’s conclusion was similar to that of Amherst himself who expressed his 
shock that ‘the circumstances attending these transactions were of so extraordinary a 
nature, so little to be accounted for by the usages of European Courts, or even by the 
practices adopted on the occasion of the last Embassy to the Emperor of China.’  He 
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complains that ‘the decorum, and the deliberation with which everything relating to 
the court ceremonies during the time of the late Emperor Tchien Lung appears to have 
been arranged and conducted’ were dispensed with in favour of ‘hurry and confusion, 
of irregularity and disorder, of insult, inhumanity and almost personal violence, 
sufficient to give the court of the Emperor Kea-king the manners, character, and 
appearance of the roving camp of a Tartar Horde.’ Surveying a detailed description of 
the ceremonials to be required from him by the Jiaqing court and the wish of the court 
to send his embassy away after a mere six days, Amherst concludes that it was 
unlikely that the embassy could have proceeded, and that the breaking off over the 
issue of the kowtow represented the best outcome in which both sides could claim 
some degree of face saving. He concludes that the number and frequency of kowtows 
required and the brusque manner of their demand would have rendered compliance 
impossible.  
 
But with us, all was hurry and precipitation. A total disregard of everything 
relating to the comfort of the individuals. An absolute banishment of decorum 
from public transactions. An unceasing attempt to hurry us into acts without a 
moment for reflection or deliberation. In short, a pervading wish to remove 
away from us every thing that constitutes the splendor or event the respectable 
appearance of an Embassy, and finally an attempt to drag us before the Emperor 
in such a guise as would befit only his vassals from the meanest and most 
barbarous island of the China seas.6 
 
 Detailed historical scholarship into the motivation of the Jiaqing court in its 
conduct of the embassy is not yet available to anything like the same extent for the 
                                                        
6 Letter to George Canning, 8th March 1817. IOR G/12/197, ff 285-299. 
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Amherst embassy as for the Macartney embassy, so in attempting to explain the 
reasons for the apparent hardening of the Chinese position regarding the ceremonial 
treatment of the embassy as perceived by the British accounts, we are required to 
speculate somewhat.7 It does appear that the Jiaqing court took a very less generous 
and flexible approach with Amherst’s embassy subjecting it to a more rigorous 
ceremonial. Additionally, the court wished the embassy to leave almost immediately 
after the audience in contravention of the prescribed forty-day residence. Certainly, 
the Jiaqing Emperor’s noted frugality is sufficient to explain his wish to see the back 
of this extremely costly visit. In the end, Amherst stayed some five months and, 
according to Davis, this residence must have cost the Chinese court something like 
£170,000 (Sketches, 1.81) roughly the same as that of Macartney. But the reason for 
the embassy’s treatment is probably is more easily explained by the Jiaqing 
Emperor’s wish to appear firm and decisive in the wake of British aggression in 
Macao and its leading participation in the booming illegal trade in opium. In an edict 
back in 14 November 1808, the emperor determined that the British must leave 
Macao describing them as ‘proud, tyrannical and generally obnoxious! [...] When the 
barbarians dare to occupy the strategic spots of our frontier, we must not show the 
least sign of weakness or cowardice!’ In an edict of 30 June 1809, the emperor 
described the British as ‘always unreasonable and dishonest’ adding that ‘we have 
been too lenient with them. From now on, we must make amends and be more severe’ 
(Fu, Documentary Chronicle, pp. 371, 377). The Chinese were highly suspicious of 
Staunton. The emperor decreed on 8 January 1815 that when he accompanied 
Macartney’s embassy as a boy Staunton showed himself to be ‘young and crafty, and 
                                                        
7 The most important published source of documents relating to the Jiaqing reign in 
English remains Lo-She Fu’s A Documentary History of Sino-Western Relations 
(University of Arizona Press: Tucson, 1966). 
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throughout the return journey drew maps of all strategic spots of the mountains and 
rivers he passed through’. He suspected that ‘probably in the long run he will make 
trouble’ and that he may have been involved in the recent incident involving H.M 
Doris’s pursuit of an American schooner in Chinese waters (p. 394). The court 
believed, wrongly, that Staunton had amassed substantial personal wealth and 
property at Canton though bribery and corruption. In 1816 the emperor was petitioned 
for help by the Rajah of Nepal against the British in Bengal, warning that they had 
designs on Tibet (pp. 401-2, 616). The emperor refused any aid but secretly 
strengthened Chinese defences on the Tibetan and Nepalese border in response.  
 From around this time also, the court was becoming increasingly aware of and 
concerned about burgeoning Chinese use and even its consumption by officers of the 
imperial guard and court eunuchs (p. 616). In April 1810, the emperor decreed that 
‘opium is a poison, undermining our good customs and morality’ and that, lately, ‘the 
purchasers and eaters of opium have become numerous’, issuing orders to suppress 
the trade (p. 380). In March 1811, the emperor decreed that ‘opium from the overseas 
countries has infiltrated into the interior and has caused so much harm [. …] This 
item, opium spreads deadly poison. Rascals and bandits indulge in it and cannot do 
without it even for a second’ and that it was supplied by ‘treacherous merchants’ (p. 
381).  In January 1815 the Chinese government adopted new measures to prohibit the 
trade, the emperor declaring, ‘Opium spreads its poison intensively’ and claiming that 
it ‘is usually smuggled in by barbarian ships’. The emperor was also aware that 
because of the trade silver was draining out of the country and ‘a serious deficit in the 
national revenue’ was occurring (pp. 399-400).  
 It seems clear than that at the time of the embassy, the emperor regarded the 
British as troublesome, potentially dangerous, and possessed of an insatiable appetite 
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for trading, especially in opium. His response was rational and pragmatic if, 
ultimately, counter productive. Of course, neither Chinese nor British were fully 
aware of the situation that was beyond both their respective conceptual worldviews. 
This was a period enormous uncertainty and anxiety for both empires, as Wang puts 
it, ‘British policy toward China, aiming to find out how the vast empire might be 
pressured, was tentative and experimental and could have gone in different 
directions.’ (White Lotus Rebels, pp. 250, 235-51) Chinese policy was also uncertain, 
which probably accounts for the emperor’s later public acceptance for the 
misunderstanding relating to the hurried audience.  
 Amherst came to the conclusion that, given the expectations of the imperial 
court, even had the audience gone ahead it is unlikely anything worthwhile would 
have been achieved. 
 
I cannot think that His Imperial Majesty’s intentions with regard to the present 
Embassy, would have satisfied the expectations of the British Government, as 
of the Honorable Company more immediately interested in the success of this 
mission, or would have appeared in the eyes of Europe either as an honourable 
or an amicable reception. I cannot flatter myself that confined to very limited a 
period of time, and subject to the will of a Man of most untoward personal 
character, it would have been possible for me or for those who acted with me to 
have obtained any thing that might be considered as an adequate return, either 
of honor or advantage for the compliment paid to the Emperor by the scale and 
composition of the present Embassy […]8 
 
                                                        
8 Letter to George Canning, 22 March, 1817. IOR G12/197, f .310. 
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He regarded the emperor’s adoption of a strict policy regarding the ceremonial aspect 
of the court as stemming from weakness rather than from strength. 
 
I conceive that no Foreign Embassador is likely to be admitted into the presence 
of the Emperor Kia-King, unless he agrees to perform, to its full extent, the 
Tartar Ceremony of the Ko-tou. Perhaps the present Emperor, whose reign has 
been frequently and very lately disturbed by insurrections of his subjects, may 
less readily dispense with outward forms of respect than his Father, whose reign 
was long and victorious, and, who, being firm in the possession of real power 
and authority, might attach less consequence to any show of external homage.9 
 
Faced with British attempts to encroach at Macao, their prosecution of an expanding 
trade in opium, and the infringement of Chinese territorial waters in their disputes 
with France and later the US, the Jiaqing court, which never solicited or encouraged 
the embassy to be sent in the first place, chose to deploy a stricter usage of Qing guest 
ritual than that of the Qianlong emperor and to countenance the dismissal of the 
embassy rather than adopt a form of compromise.  
 
The kowtow controversy 
The controversy over the embassy’s dismissal thus came to feature prominently in 
accounts of the embassy’s apparent failure as symbolizing the Chinese court’s 
despotic and condescending attitude to other nations. James L. Hevia has influentially 
argued that European and Americans fetishized the kowtow embedding the 
ceremonial in the context of an European discourse of humiliation and abasement 
                                                        
9 Letter to Canning, 21 April, 1817. IOR G12/197, f. 378. 
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familiar to them but entirely foreign to Chinese understanding of the ritual. (Hevia, 
‘Ultimate Gesture’, p. 213; Wills, Past and Present) He details the complexity of the 
ceremony and its multiple meanings within a Confucian cosmology that did not 
expound the virtues of abject servitude, far from it. The Ming and Qing emperors 
personally kowtowed to Confucius ancestral shrine and kowtowed at the command of 
a court official when he worshipped at the Temple of Heaven (Crossley, The 
Manchus, p. 124) The kowtow was only one facet of the very complex but also 
routine ceremony of Qing government. Europeans, however, chose to isolate the 
practice from its cultural context and read into it their own binaries of western 
freedom and Asiatic despotism, servitude and independence. Ming and later Qing 
China arranged the visits of European embassies in terms of their established system 
of tributary relations. Europeans with a different set of notions of international 
diplomacy, largely established by the Westphalian system at the conclusion of the 
Thirty Years War, were aware of Chinese practices and viewed the kowtow as a 
ceremony implying submission to the Chinese emperor rather than the sovereign 
equality that they were seeking to establish. Both forms of practice, as Hevia argues, 
were equally a product of the specific political and ceremonial discourses of their 
respective polities.  
 The Macartney embassy was aware of the issue of the kowtow and the 
imperial court also understood, to an extent, British sensibilities. The full kowtow was 
dispensed with, after a period of prolonged negotiation, for the Macartney audience 
with the emperor at the Mountain Resort for Escaping Summer Heat (Bishu 
shanjuang) at Chengde of September 1793. Macartney formally negotiated a 
compromise by which he knelt on one knee before the emperor as he would before his 
sovereign George III, and bowed his head, delivering his letter from his king directly 
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into the emperor’s hands. Macartney did not reject the ceremony out of hand; he 
agreed to perform the full public kowtow if a Chinese official of equivalent rank 
undertook the ceremony before a portrait of the British king, or if the emperor 
promised in writing that on a future occasion such an official if presented to the king 
would also perform the full ceremony.  For him, the issue of national reciprocity was 
much more important than the physical performance itself. As Hevia has argued, in 
this case rather than the Qing court insisting on an inflexible ceremony, it was willing, 
albeit reluctantly, to allow an altered version of the ceremony to take place both to 
accommodate British concerns and successfully (in Qing terms) complete the visit 
and arrange the embassy’s speedy departure.  This was because it understood that the 
visit of a British embassy was unprecedented and needed bespoke handling (Hevia, 
‘Ultimate debasement’, p. 227).  
 After Macartney’s mission, the Dutch East India Company had sent an 
embassy led by Isaac Titsingh, including Andreas Everardus van Braam Houckgeest, 
who authored the main account. The Dutch seemed to have no issues about 
performing the ceremony and their embassy undertook the full kowtow but received, 
according to the British, less preferential treatment than Macartney. Barrow’s Travels 
in China of 1804 defended Macartney from the charge that his refusal to adopt an 
‘unconditional compliance with all the humiliating ceremonies which the Chinese 
might have thought proper to extract from him’ would have led to a more favourable 
conclusion to the embassy (p. 7). He argued that the willingness of the Dutch in 1794-
95, to ‘humiliate themselves at least thirty different times’ led to no positive outcomes 
questioning what ‘advantages can reasonably be expected to accrue from a servile and 
unconditional compliance with the submissions required by this haughty government’ 
after ‘such a vile reception and degrading treatment?’ Barrow recalled how van 
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Braam, a corpulent man, was subject to the imperial laughter when his wig fell off in 
front of the emperor while undertaking the ceremonial (pp. 10, 11, 13). Davis in 1836 
would also recall the embarrassment of the Dutch as a confirmation of the correctness 
of the British conduct: 
 
The embassy occurred in 1795, during the era of small-clothes, and before 
liberal principles had been generally established in dress, as in other matters; 
and these hapless Dutchmen were made, on the most trivial occasions of 
ceremony, to perform their evolutions, while the wicked mandarins stood by 
and laughed—and who would not?—at what has been diplomatically styled ‘the 
embarrassment of a Dutch-built stern in tight inexpressibles.’ (The Chinese, 75) 
 
Barrow, as Davis, claims that the Chinese treated the English with more respect than 
the Dutch because of ‘the character and independent spirit’ of the nation as well as its 
great power over which they cast ‘a jealous eye’. It was Macartney’s ‘manly and open 
conduct’, which affirmed this demonstrated by his refusal to kowtow unconditionally. 
Barrow writes of the profound effect of ‘the refusal of an individual to comply with 
the ceremonies of the country’ on the emperor and his court and how ‘greatly must 
their pride have been mortified’ (Travels, pp. 17-18). In Barrow’s account the Qing 
court is presented as proud, haughty, and insolent, never for a moment relaxing its 
rigid ‘long established customs’ except in the single case of the this British embassy. 
The lesson learnt is clear, ‘a tone of submission, and a tame and passive obedience to 
the degrading demands of this haughty court, serve only to feed its pride, and add to 
the absurd notions of its own vast importance’ (pp. 20-21, 24).  
 In 1805 the Russian ambassador Count Yuri Golovkin led a mission to Beijing 
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to secure permission for Russian ships to enter Canton, to negotiate for the opening of 
a Russian consulate in Beijing and to secure Chinese agreement to the despatch of a 
Russian mission to Tibet. Golovkin, though apparently willing to kowtow in the 
imperial presence, refused to undertake the ceremony for items symbolic of this 
presence and his mission ended (Mancall, Russia and China, pp. 250-55). Although 
Amherst similarly refused to undertake such symbolic kowtowing yet the possibility 
of performing the imperial kowtow was left open until very late in the embassy.  
 Both British and Chinese regarded the reception of the Macartney embassy as 
a precedent for the conduct of the new embassy (Fu, Documentary Chronicle, pp. 
618-619; Hevia, ‘Ultimate Gesture’, pp. 214-15). An extract from the Canton Secret 
Consultations of 12 February opines that, 
 
In a Country where precedent & Custom carry with them so much weight, and 
under the circumstances of the precedent of Lord Macartney’s Embassy being 
so favourable to our views, we consider it to be one of the clearest and most 
unexceptionable rules that can be laid down for our guidance in the execution of 
the very delicate & important trust now under consideration, to adhere as 
strictly as possible to the line of the proceeding which that precedent has 
suggested.10 
 
Unfortunately, neither party could now agree on exactly what ceremony Macartney 
had performed. The embassy insisted Macartney only performed the compromised 
version of the ceremony, whereas the court maintained that Macartney had 
                                                        
10 Extract from the Canton Secret Consultations 12 February, 1816. IOR G12/196, ff. 
187-88. 
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undertaken the full kowtow. The situation was complicated by the fact that both the 
Jiaqing Emperor and Staunton were present during Macartney’s audience and neither 
agreed as to what occurred. It was diplomatically difficult for the British to query the 
accuracy of events affirmed by the imperial memory. Though there is some evidence 
that the Jiaqing Emperor considered the possibility of adapting the ceremony to that 
the British claimed as practiced by Macartney, the preparation for Amherst’s embassy 
was much stricter with the court issuing a very detailed description of the audience 
itself and what was to be required from the ambassador (Pritchard, ‘The kowtow’, pp. 
173-74; Hevia, ‘Ultimate Gesture’, p. 214).  Amherst’s ambiguous instructions 
directed him to conform ‘to all the ceremonies of that court’ which did not lessen his 
dignity or ‘commit the honour of your Sovereign’ (Staunton, Notes, p. xx).  Henry 
Ellis, while admitting the ceremony to signify ‘oriental barbarism’ believed that it was 
a point of ‘etiquette’ that might have been complied with rather than sacrifice the 
entire objects of the embassy (Journal, p. 151). Writing in 1818 in the Edinburgh 
Review, John Crawfurd, argued that the ceremony did not appear ‘much more 
humiliating than other court ceremonies’ and the negotiations to avoid it were simply 
‘absurd’. (29, 436-7) British attitudes to kowtowing post-Macartney were thus by no 
means homogenous.  
 In his Notes of Proceedings and Occurrences (1824), Staunton squarely 
blamed the Chinese ceremonial for the failure of the mission, although his own 
inclusion had badly irritated the Chinese. Considered by many as the leading British 
‘China expert’ of the time, he advised Amherst strongly against any compliance with 
the ceremony and Amherst to his experience. He remained adamant that any retreat 
from the precedent of Macartney ‘would be a sacrifice of national credit and 
character; and as such would operate injuriously to the trade and interests of the East-
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India Company at Canton’ (p. 662). Barrow reviewing the narratives of the Amherst 
embassies in two substantial articles for the Quarterly Review for 1817, followed this 
line, arguing that it was on the ‘refusal or compliance with this degrading and 
humiliating demand’ that ‘England must continue to maintain, in the eyes of this 
haughty government, that high rank and independent spirit for which she had hitherto 
been known to them, or set the seal of vassalage to her submission, and be registered 
among the number of their petty tributaries’ (pp. 408, 412). To those at home who 
criticised Amherst’s pride in refusing to undertake the ceremony, Barrow claims that 
‘it was this kind of pride, which, in the early days of England’s history raised her 
reputation in foreign courts, gained for her commerce substantial advantages, and 
made her alliance an object of solicitude’ (pp. 33, 476). Throughout these narratives 
and their reception, the British emphasized virtues such as dignity, respect, firmness, 
and manliness and described the ceremony as abject, offensive, humiliating, 
disgusting, and debasing. They understood this as a clash between an open, brave, and 
manly British character and a haughty, arrogant, and insolent Chinese ‘character’.  
 Amherst came to believe that any last minute promises made by imperial 
officers were meaningless and that ‘the Emperor never had consented, but also 
extremely probable that he never would consent to admit me to his presence under 
any other conditions than the performance of the ceremony of prostration.’11  In this 
he was probably correct. The underlying British position is probably best summed up 
by the missionary, Robert Morrison in his Memoir of the Principal Occurrences 
during an Embassy from the British Government to the Court of China in the Year 
1816 (1820). Here Morrison outlines the precepts underlining the British mission to 
                                                        
11 Letter to George Canning, 22 March 22, 1817. IOR G/12/197, f. 314. 
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China based on commercial and diplomatic reciprocity, couched in the language of 
civic rationality: 
 
As individuals are improved by an amicable intercourse with each other; and as 
parts of the dame empire are gradually ameliorated in proportion as they have 
an easy intercourse amongst themselves; so separate and independent nations 
are mutually benefitted by a liberal and amicable intercourse. Those 
governments which with sincere minds endeavour to extend the friendly 
intercourse of nations, deserve the thanks of mankind. Whilst they pursue the 
good of their own country, they promote the welfare of the species […] 
exchange of commodities, or commercial intercourse, tends to ameliorate the 
temporal condition of the whole human family […] national and commercial 
intercourse will proceed best under an idea of the equality and reciprocity of the 
two countries. (pp. 1-2) 
 
Morrison argues that while some ceremonies are simply ‘mere forms’ and essentially 
meaningless, others imply submission and homage. It is in this latter context that he 
understands the ‘ceremony called the San-kweikew-kow; thrice kneeling and nine 
times beating the head against the ground’ that only those nations that consider 
themselves tributary to China should perform. Morrison has, of course, internalised 
and universalised a Eurocentric understanding of personal and diplomatic relations, 
based on affective, polite, and reciprocal undertakings. These apparent norms had 
little meaning for Qing understandings of relations between China and other polities, 
premised as they were on mutual understanding of obligation and hierarchy.  
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 Four years after the Amherst embassy departed from China, the Jiaqing 
Emperor was dead. The Daoguang Emperor inherited the problems that his 
predecessor had only just managed to fend off. The issues that would begin to 
dominate Sino-British relations in his reign would be concerned with the demise of 
the East India Company’s monopoly of the China trade in 1833 and the impact of the 
opium trade on the Chinese people and the Qing economy, exacerbated by the ‘opium 
rush’ occasioned by the curtailment of the monopoly. But it seems that the 
deployment of the kowtow and the conduct of Qing guest rituals by the Qianlong and 
Jiaqing courts was a direct and strategic response to current political realities. 
Whereas both sides could claim Macartney’s embassy as successful with some degree 
of justice, it was very much harder for either Britons or Chinese to maintain the 
Amherst embassy as successful, except in the rather special sense that it helped both 
nations to clarify their positions in the lead up to the First Opium War. A clear 
trajectory from the embassy to armed conflict, however, should be viewed with 
caution. While the East India Company maintained its monopoly of the China trade 
and opium production in Bengal there remained some stability. Eventually, the move 
to free trade, the termination of the Company’s monopoly, and the subsequent ‘opium 
rush’ wee the key factors in creating the conditions that precipitated war. To the 
extent that neither Britons nor Chinese seem to have either contemplated or desired 
armed conflict in the wake of the Amherst embassy to China may lead us to regard it 
as a qualified success in the short term at least. 
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